Chinese policy makers have acted for the last year and a half as if their inflation problem could be solved easily while growth continues to tick along at 8% or faster. Now they are starting to realize that the problem is more serious. But they still misunderstand why China is overheating. The root cause is a massive increase in the money supply over the past two years that is still filtering through the economy.

　　中國(guó)決策者過(guò)去一年半的種種行為都似乎表明，他們可在經(jīng)濟(jì)繼續(xù)以8%甚至更高速度增長(zhǎng)的同時(shí)，輕易解決通貨膨脹問(wèn)題。如今他們開(kāi)始意識(shí)到，這個(gè)問(wèn)題比預(yù)想得更為嚴(yán)重，但卻仍對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)過(guò)熱的根源存在誤解。其實(shí)，真正的原因在于過(guò)去兩年中國(guó)大幅增加貨幣供應(yīng)，這些供應(yīng)目前仍在不斷向?qū)嶓w經(jīng)濟(jì)滲透。

　　Data released last Friday showed consumer prices in March rose by 5.4% year-on-year, the highest in three years. And there's more yet to come, as Beijing was too slow to start cooling China's red hot economy. Being too slow means that unless policy makers bring real GDP growth sharply below trend, China is at risk of runaway inflation.

　　上周五發(fā)布的經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，3月份消費(fèi)者價(jià)格指數(shù)(CPI)同比上升5.4%，為三年來(lái)最高升幅。由于中國(guó)政府在為過(guò)熱的經(jīng)濟(jì)降溫方面出手太慢，通脹率尚未達(dá)到峰值。這里的出手太慢意味著，除非決策者讓中國(guó)GDP的實(shí)際增長(zhǎng)率大幅降至近年來(lái)的一般增速以下，否則中國(guó)就可能面臨通脹失控的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

　　There is a tendency among Chinese policy makers to attribute the cause of inflation to supply-side factors, like bad weather that creates food shortages. But the real cause is Beijing's stimulus plan after China's economy plunged into recession in late 2008. The increase in broad money as a share of GDP was close to 40% in 2009 and the first half of 2010, much higher than the previous peak of 27% in 2003.

　　Getty Images上個(gè)月，中國(guó)總理溫家寶在北京出席一次新聞發(fā)布會(huì)。中國(guó)決策者傾向于把通脹原因歸咎為供應(yīng)方面的因素，如造成糧食短缺的惡劣天氣等。但真正的原因在于北京方面為應(yīng)對(duì)2008年末中國(guó)陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退而出臺(tái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激方案。廣義貨幣供應(yīng)量的增長(zhǎng)在2009年和2010年上半年占GDP的比重接近40%，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于2003年占比27%的峰值。

　　Beijing's monetary boost certainly revived growth. The rebound that started in the spring of 2009 was spectacular, but within just a couple of quarters the economy had overheated. By the middle of 2009 inflation began to accelerate, and it did so on all fronts. Consumer prices, property prices and wages all began to rise at a faster pace. Against this evidence, it is hard to argue that inflation in China has been anything else but a monetary phenomenon.

　　中國(guó)政府增加貨幣供應(yīng)量的做法無(wú)疑提振了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)于2009年春天開(kāi)始了強(qiáng)勁復(fù)蘇，但僅在幾個(gè)季度內(nèi)就開(kāi)始變得過(guò)熱。到2009年中期，通脹開(kāi)始在各個(gè)領(lǐng)域加速。消費(fèi)品價(jià)格、房?jī)r(jià)和工資全都開(kāi)始以更高的速度增長(zhǎng)。以此來(lái)看，很難說(shuō)中國(guó)的通脹不是一種貨幣現(xiàn)象。

　　The dangers of this monetary excess are becoming evident. China may be on the brink of a vicious wage-inflation spiral, which could undermine the authorities' grip over the economy. Actual inflation could well be higher than the official 5.4% in March. That's why Beijing is now hurriedly tightening. Still, this policy action comes too late in the day: Inflation had been on the rise for over a year and real deposit rates had been negative for nearly a year before the authorities began a meaningful withdrawal of the monetary stimulus.

　　貨幣供應(yīng)過(guò)多帶來(lái)的種種危害正在逐一顯現(xiàn)。中國(guó)可能正處于一種惡性的工資-通脹螺旋式上升的邊緣，而這種形式的上升可能不利于當(dāng)局對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的控制。3月份實(shí)際通脹率很可能高于官方通報(bào)的5.4%，這也是當(dāng)前中國(guó)政府忙不迭地實(shí)行緊縮政策的原因。盡管如此，它的行動(dòng)還是開(kāi)始得太晚了。通脹率一年多來(lái)不斷上升，而實(shí)際存款利率在有關(guān)當(dāng)局開(kāi)始真正退出貨幣刺激政策之前，已有近一年都為負(fù)值。

　　It is important to trace the monetary impetus to inflation through the stages of the business cycle to understand what the delayed policy response now means for growth. An economy is overheated and inflation starts to rise if the level of actual output is above the economy's potential. Potential output can be defined on the basis of a given degree of spare capacity: Wherever there is a tradeoff between higher output and higher prices, essentially some capacity must remain idle. The closer an economy approaches the full use of its limited resources, the more prices rise to pull unused resources into production.

　　為了理解政策反應(yīng)滯后對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)意味著什么，很重要的一點(diǎn)就是要追蹤在商業(yè)周期的不同階段貨幣供應(yīng)對(duì)通脹水平的推動(dòng)作用。如果一國(guó)的實(shí)際產(chǎn)出超過(guò)其潛在產(chǎn)出，這個(gè)國(guó)家就會(huì)出現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)過(guò)熱，通貨膨脹也會(huì)開(kāi)始抬頭。對(duì)潛在產(chǎn)出的定義可以一定水平的閑置生產(chǎn)能力為依據(jù)。只要產(chǎn)出和價(jià)格之間存在相互推動(dòng)、交替上升的現(xiàn)象，基本上就可以說(shuō)，一定有某些生產(chǎn)能力被閑置。一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體越是不斷接近其有限資源被完全利用的水平，就有越來(lái)越多的商品通過(guò)提價(jià)的方式來(lái)把那些未經(jīng)利用的資源投入生產(chǎn)。

　　There was spare capacity in the economy in late 2008 and early 2009, because the external demand that kept China's factories chugging had slumped, pushing the economy into recession. So actual output fell below potential, and annual inflation slowed quickly, turning negative in early 2009. By mid-2009, growth had rebounded strongly and spare capacity started getting used up, with too many yuan chasing too few goods and services. By the fall of 2009 the level of actual output was already above the economy's potential and has stayed there since. If the tightening had begun then, inflation wouldn't have gotten as bad.

　　2008年末和2009年初，中國(guó)就曾出現(xiàn)過(guò)閑置生產(chǎn)能力，這是由于以前維持中國(guó)工廠滿(mǎn)負(fù)荷運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的外部需求突然大幅減少，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)隨即陷入衰退，實(shí)際產(chǎn)出低于潛在產(chǎn)出，年均通脹率的升幅迅速放緩，并在2009年初變?yōu)樨?fù)值。然而到2009年中期，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)開(kāi)始強(qiáng)勁反彈，閑置生產(chǎn)能力也開(kāi)始被完全利用，出現(xiàn)了過(guò)多的人民幣追逐過(guò)少的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的現(xiàn)象。到2009年秋季，實(shí)際產(chǎn)出水平已經(jīng)超過(guò)了經(jīng)濟(jì)潛能，并一直延續(xù)至今。如果在那時(shí)中國(guó)政府就開(kāi)始收緊政策，通脹問(wèn)題不會(huì)失控到今天這個(gè)地步。

　　The good news is that the recent tightening efforts may have begun to bite. On a three-month annualized basis, a better guide to recent trends, broad money, or M2, growth slowed to 8.4% in March from as high as 28.5% last October. China published quarterly real GDP growth for the first time last Friday, showing growth slowed to 2.1% in the first quarter of this calendar year from 2.4% in the fourth quarter last year. Lombard Street Research estimates its own quarterly real GDP growth for China, which suggests that the official data could be understating the extent of the slowdown in the first quarter.

　　好消息是，近來(lái)中國(guó)政府做出的緊縮努力可能已開(kāi)始初見(jiàn)成效。廣義貨幣供應(yīng)(M2)可以幫助我們更好地看清最近的趨勢(shì)。按每季度的年化統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)看，中國(guó)的廣義貨幣供應(yīng)從去年10月高達(dá)28.5%的增長(zhǎng)率已放慢至今年3月的8.4%。上周五，中國(guó)第一次發(fā)布了有關(guān)GDP季度實(shí)際增長(zhǎng)率的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)。數(shù)據(jù)顯示，中國(guó)實(shí)際GDP增長(zhǎng)率從去年第四季度的2.4%減緩至今年第一季度的2.1%。宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)預(yù)測(cè)顧問(wèn)公司Lombard Street Research對(duì)中國(guó)GDP季度實(shí)際增長(zhǎng)率做了自己的估測(cè)，結(jié)果表明，官方數(shù)據(jù)可能對(duì)今年第一季度經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩的程度有所淡化。

　　Beijing seems serious about winning the battle with inflation. Policy makers have also shown that they understand the need for China's growth model to move away from the credit-fuelled investment binges of the past, and that this means structurally lower growth. The question is, how prepared is Beijing to accept much slower growth and its social and political consequences?

　　中國(guó)政府似乎有很大的決心，一定要贏得抗通脹斗爭(zhēng)的勝利。另外，決策者也表現(xiàn)出，他們知道中國(guó)的增長(zhǎng)模式需擺脫過(guò)去那種信貸推動(dòng)的投資熱，并且知道這種模式的轉(zhuǎn)變意味著改變中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的內(nèi)在結(jié)構(gòu)，放慢經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)速度。但問(wèn)題是，面對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增速大大放緩以及隨之而來(lái)的社會(huì)和政治問(wèn)題，中國(guó)準(zhǔn)備好了嗎？