Who should manage Buffett's billions? Or China's?

　　應(yīng)由誰來管理巴菲特抑或中國的億萬資金？

　　WHEN Warren Buffett took over a fading textile company named Berkshire Hathaway in 1965, Mao Zedong was still plotting his Cultural Revolution, which forced anyone suspected of capitalist tendencies into crushing manual labour. From these rather different points of departure, both Mr Buffett and the People's Republic of China have arrived at a similar dilemma. Mr Buffett is now groping to replace himself as head of a company that has become, in essence, a $170 billion investment fund. The Chinese government meanwhile has yet to name the chief of its own, outsized investment fund, which will be split off from its $1 trillion-worth of foreign-exchange reserves.

　　1965年，當(dāng)沃倫.巴菲特接手一個(gè)叫作伯克希爾.哈撒維的日漸蕭條的紡織品公司時(shí)，毛澤東還在策劃文革，強(qiáng)迫任何被懷疑有資本主義傾向的人接受艱苦勞改。雖然起點(diǎn)大相徑庭，但是巴菲特和中國卻都陷入了相似的進(jìn)退兩難之境。巴菲特正尋找接班人來接替其公司領(lǐng)袖位置，該公司實(shí)質(zhì)上相當(dāng)于1700億美元投資基金。此時(shí)，中國政府則將任命主管來管理從其價(jià)值達(dá)1萬億美元的外匯儲(chǔ)備中分離出來的巨額投資基金。

　　The predicaments facing Mr Buffett, the consummate capitalist, and the Chinese government, still avowedly communist, meet many levels. Both are loss-averse; both have concerns about the dollar; neither can do much in Chinese currency (Berkshire by law, though it has managed to lose money speculating in yuan; China by mission). Both also suffer from their size. Whatever they hope to buy tends to become pricey because they are buying it. As Berkshire's fame and weight has increased, its returns have shrunk.

　　徹頭徹尾的資本家巴菲特和仍公開承認(rèn)是共產(chǎn)主義的中國所面臨的困境在很多層面上交匯。兩方都規(guī)避損失、關(guān)注美元；兩方都無法在人民幣問題上大有作為（伯克希爾公司是出于法律原因，雖然其仍“成功”在人民幣投機(jī)買賣上虧損；中國則是出于使命原因）。兩方都因規(guī)模而處于不利地位。無論兩方想購買什么，該物品都會(huì)因其購買而變得價(jià)格昂貴。隨著伯克希爾公司名譽(yù)和分量的提升，其回報(bào)反而縮水了。

　　And yet, despite these handicaps, both aspire to large returns. For Berkshire, a publicly listed company, this goes without saying. It is also true for the new Chinese fund, however. Qu Hongbin, chief China economist at HSBC, says the fund will probably be charged the one-year bond rate of about 3% for the assets it manages. But because its funds will not be denominated in Chinese currency, it will also have to compensate for the appreciation of the yuan, which Mr Qu expects to be 3-5% a year. On top of that will be management costs of 1-2%. In sum, the fund may have to produce double-digit returns, which would not be that different from Berkshire's. This may cause it to hold the same kind of volatile assets, such as equities, commodities and junk debt.

　　盡管障礙重重，兩方都仍熱盼取得高額回報(bào)。對(duì)伯克希爾這一上市公司來說，這不言而喻。然而，對(duì)中國新成立的基金來說也是如此。匯豐銀行首席中國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家屈宏斌表示，根據(jù)其管理的資產(chǎn)，該基金可能將被收取大約3%的1年期債卷利率。而且由于其基金不會(huì)以人民幣記價(jià)，它也將需要補(bǔ)償人民幣升值的影響。屈宏斌預(yù)計(jì)人民幣每年將升值3-5%。除此之外該基金還有1—2%的管理費(fèi)用。總而言之，該基金可能需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)造兩位數(shù)利潤(rùn)，這將與伯克希爾公司的利潤(rùn)相差不大。這也許會(huì)使得該基金持有同種類的波動(dòng)資產(chǎn)，例如股票、商品或垃圾債券。

　　Both Berkshire and Beijing share some advantages as well. Berkshire is seen as a buyer of choice, Mr Buffett says, by many owners of good, non-public companies. Dodgy governments, rich in resources and eager for loans, may likewise view China's government as a creditor of choice. Its fund may also be an attractive investor for companies seeking to do business in China. Wal-Mart, for example, a large holding of Berkshire's, is expanding in China but would probably have an easier time if the government had a stake in its success.

　　伯克希爾公司和中國也都有同樣的優(yōu)勢(shì)。巴菲特表示很多好的私有公司都認(rèn)為伯克希爾公司是最好的買家。同樣的，那些資源豐富、渴求貸款而老奸巨猾的政府也可能認(rèn)為中國政府是最好的債權(quán)人。對(duì)意圖在中國發(fā)展生意的公司來說，該基金也可能成為富有吸引力的投資者。例如，伯克希爾公司的大股東沃爾瑪正在中國擴(kuò)張。但若中國政府能從其成功獲利，其擴(kuò)張將更為簡(jiǎn)單。

　　But Berkshire and the China fund do differ in two big ways. The first is the type of person they will employ. Mr Buffett wants an independent soul who will make contrarian calls; China is rumoured already to have chosen a fund manager who clocked up many years at its finance ministry—guaranteeing his lack of independence. A contrarian streak is a virtue on Wall Street; it can be a vice in Beijing.

　　但是，伯克希爾公司和中國基金在兩方面大相徑庭。其一在于兩方將雇傭的人員。巴菲特期望雇用敢于與大眾相悖的充滿獨(dú)立精神的人；而傳聞?wù)f中國已選擇了個(gè)蝸居在其財(cái)政部多年因而絕對(duì)缺乏獨(dú)立性的基金管理者。在美國金融界，稍許與大眾相悖的精神是種美德；而在中國的話，這卻可能是缺陷。

　　The second difference is more subtle. Chinese officials suggest the fund will be expected to do “good” things, by valuing social and political returns, as well as financial ones. Mr Buffett has split these responsibilities. Berkshire's goal is to make money. If shareholders also want to do good, they can give their profits away, as Mr Buffett has pledged to do with his own. As a result, his successor has a clearer mandate and a better chance of success.

　　第二處不同更為微妙。中國官員提出通過衡量社會(huì)和政治回報(bào)及金融回報(bào)，期待該基金被用于“行善”。而巴菲特則將這些責(zé)任分離開來。伯克希爾公司的目標(biāo)是贏利。如果股東也想行善，他們可以捐獻(xiàn)自己得到的利潤(rùn)，正如巴菲特承諾要捐獻(xiàn)他得到的利潤(rùn)。所以，巴菲特的接班人有更明確的指示和更大的機(jī)會(huì)取得成功。

　　Whether China's more muddled effort can also succeed is less sure. A better approach might be to free its currency a bit, slow its accumulation of reserves and thus avoid the conundrum of how to invest them. China's government once wanted no truck with big capitalists like Mr Buffett. Now it thinks it can outdo them.

　　中國較為混亂無序的努力是否也能成功，這就不那么確定了。略微放松人民幣的管制、放慢儲(chǔ)備積累以避免不知如何投資的難題可能是個(gè)更好的方法。中國政府曾希望不與巴菲特等大資本家往來?，F(xiàn)在，中國又認(rèn)為可以超越這些大資本家。