In his new book, “Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance,” scheduled to be published in September, Peterson Institute for International Economics scholar Arvind Subramanian starts with a nightmare scenario: It's 2021 and the U.S. president heads across town to the International Monetary Fund to sign a rescue loan package negotiated by the IMF's Chinese managing director. “The handover of world dominance is complete,” Mr. Subramanian, a former IMF researcher, writes. China is now the world's leading economic power.

　　彼得森國際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)學(xué)者阿文德•薩博拉曼尼亞(Arvind Subramanian)在他將于今年9月出版的新書《黯然失色：生活在中國經(jīng)濟(jì)主導(dǎo)地位的陰影下》(Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance)中，以這樣一個(gè)噩夢(mèng)般的場(chǎng)景開篇：2021年的某一天，美國總統(tǒng)跑去距離白宮不遠(yuǎn)的國際貨幣基金組織(International Monetary Fund)，簽署一份與該組織的中國籍總裁商討達(dá)成的救助貸款一攬子協(xié)議。曾任IMF研究員的薩博拉曼尼亞寫道，“世界主導(dǎo)權(quán)的交接已經(jīng)完成。”如今的中國已是一個(gè)在全球處于領(lǐng)先地位的經(jīng)濟(jì)大國。

　　Parts of “Eclipse' read like a wonky version of 'Rising Sun,” Michael Crichton's 1992 novel of Japanese dominance over the U.S. when Tokyo was seen as speeding toward number one. But Mr. Subramanian is a first-class economist who uses his book to discuss provocatively U.S.-Chinese relations and the nature of economic power. He was interviewed in Washington DC by the Wall Street Journal's Bob Davis.

　　Below is an edited transcript Reuters這本書的部分篇章讀起來和邁克爾•克萊頓(Michael Crichton)的小說《升起的太陽》(Rising Sun)有些像。后者是一部關(guān)于日本控制美國的小說，出版于1992年，那時(shí)的日本經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展迅速，大有趕超美國成為全球第一的態(tài)勢(shì)。不過薩博拉曼尼亞是一位優(yōu)秀的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家，他寫這本書是為了啟發(fā)讀者展開對(duì)于中美關(guān)系以及經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力本質(zhì)的討論?！度A爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》記者鮑勃•戴維斯(Bob Davis)不久前在美國華盛頓特區(qū)對(duì)薩博拉曼尼亞進(jìn)行了專訪，以下是經(jīng)過編輯的專訪內(nèi)容。

　　Do you really think the U.S. eventually will have to turn, hat-in-hand to the IMF for aid?

　　《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》：你真的認(rèn)為美國最終會(huì)不得不畢恭畢敬地向國際貨幣基金組織尋求援助嗎？

　　I wrote it that way partly to shock and make people pay attention. But there is a real possibility of the U.S. being in such a dire economic situation that it might have to turn to the IMF.

　　薩博拉曼尼亞：我這么寫一部分原因是希望警醒世人，讓人們關(guān)注這個(gè)問題。不過的確存在這種可能性，美國經(jīng)濟(jì)有可能陷入那種不得不需要向國際貨幣基金組織尋求援助的困境。

　　How could it happen? The combination of a credible rising power in China, with which we have to cooperate and also be wary of. And broad economic weakness in the U.S., including slow growth, fiscal weakness, political paralysis and a middle class with diminishing prospects.

　　怎么會(huì)發(fā)生這種事？一方面中國經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力正在不容置疑地日漸強(qiáng)大，對(duì)此美國人既不得不予以配合，同時(shí)又不得不心存警惕。另一方面美國經(jīng)濟(jì)疲軟之處卻是處處皆是，包括經(jīng)濟(jì)增長速度緩慢、財(cái)政狀況羸弱、政府無能、中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的前途每況愈下。

　　The probability of U.S. needing an IMF loan isn't 80% but it's not 2% or 5% either. It's a 10% or 20% possibility.

　　美國需要國際貨幣基金組織提供貸款的可能性不會(huì)是80%那么高，但也不是2%或是5%。這件事發(fā)生的可能性有10%或20%。

　　By some of the measures you use, China already is a larger economy than the U.S. But haven't you picked economic statistics that play to China's advantage? For example relying on purchasing power parity to measure GDP. (Purchasing power parity, or PPP, is a statistical device that tries to take account of the different prices of goods and services in different countries.)

　　《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》：按照一些你使用的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量，中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力已經(jīng)超越美國了。不過，你所挑選的是不是那些對(duì)中國有利的經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)呢？比如說，依靠購買力平價(jià)來衡量國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)。（購買力平價(jià)(Purchasing Power Parity, 簡(jiǎn)稱PPP)，是一種試圖將不同國家的不同商品和服務(wù)價(jià)格納入同一考量范疇的統(tǒng)計(jì)工具。）

　　PPP is an important concept, but it has a small weight in my overall formula of economic power.

　　薩博拉曼尼亞：購買力平價(jià)是個(gè)重要的概念，不過在我對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力的整套評(píng)估系統(tǒng)中所占權(quán)重很小。

　　I believe that the resources a country brings to the power table includes resources that are internationally traded and resources that involve people. If the U.S. were to fight against China and 100 Chinese soldiers faced 100 US soldiers, would you say that because the 100 Chinese soldiers earn/20th of what an American soldier earns that the value of a Chinese soldier is 1/20th the value of American? I don't think so. (PPP tries to account for such anomalies.)

　　我認(rèn)為，為一個(gè)國家?guī)斫?jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力的資源包括那些能在全球交易的資源，也包括與人相關(guān)的資源。假設(shè)美國將與中國交戰(zhàn)，這時(shí)有100名中國士兵與100名美國士兵交火，你能說因?yàn)槟?00名中國士兵掙的錢只是美國士兵的二十分之一，所以一名中國士兵的價(jià)值只是一名美國士兵的二十分之一嗎？我可不這么認(rèn)為。（而購買力平價(jià)理論則證明上述反常理的說法成立。）

　　You also say that China will be a far larger economic power than the U.S. by 2020 or certainly 2030, even if China's growth rate falls significantly or the U.S's rises significantly. Why is that?

　　《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》：你還提到，即使中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增速大幅減慢或是美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增速明顯加快，到2020年，或者最遲到2030年，中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過美國。為什么這么說呢？

　　The way economic convergence between the U.S. and China is evolving, the fact that China will catch up is inevitable. At end of 20 years, China will have a GDP per capita of only 40-50% of the U.S. But China has four times the population of the U.S., so the Chinese economy will be much larger overall. The arithmetic is undeniable.

　　薩博拉曼尼亞：中美兩國之間的經(jīng)濟(jì)差距正在縮小，而中國最終將會(huì)迎頭趕上也是無可爭(zhēng)辯的事實(shí)。20年后，中國的人均GDP將只有美國的40-50%，不過中國的人口數(shù)量是美國的四倍，因此中國經(jīng)濟(jì)總量將比美國大得多。這個(gè)數(shù)字上的差異是不容置疑的。

　　China will have an economic crisis over the next 20 years, no doubt. But it will recover and return to some decent level of growth.

　　中國未來20年將會(huì)有一場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)，這一點(diǎn)毫無疑問。不過中國將會(huì)走出危機(jī)，恢復(fù)到一個(gè)不錯(cuò)的增長水平。

　　If China has a big economic shock, it has the policy space [including the ability to broadly stimulate the economy] to prevent one or two years of negative growth from translating into many years of slow growth.

　　即便中國出現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)蕩，它也擁有足夠的政策空間（包括廣泛刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)的能力）來防止一兩年的經(jīng)濟(jì)負(fù)增長演變成多年的低速增長。

　　What's the significance of China as number one?

　　《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》：中國成為全球第一意味著什么呢？

　　Potentially, China has the ability to exercise its power in slightly unbenign ways. Look at what's happening today on exchange rate. [By keeping its currency undervalued] China is pursuing a beggar they- neighbor policy and nobody can stop them. That's sign of dominance.

　　薩博拉曼尼亞：存在這種可能性，中國將有能力以不那么友善的方式利用其實(shí)力?？纯唇裉煸趨R率問題上都發(fā)生了些什么。（中國將匯率維持在低估水平）中國采取以鄰為壑的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策，而沒有人能夠阻止他們。這是占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位的一種表現(xiàn)。

　　The U.S. is totally powerless to stop China because U.S. companies have so much at stake in China that China can call the shots. Asia won't do it because Asian economies are part of a value-added chain with China. Africa won't do it because China has made so much investment there..

　　美國完全沒有能力阻止中國，因?yàn)槊绹髽I(yè)對(duì)中國的依賴太多，中國掌握著主動(dòng)權(quán)。亞洲國家不會(huì)去阻止中國，因?yàn)閬喼藿?jīng)濟(jì)體是中國利益鏈條中的一部分。非洲國家也不會(huì)阻止中國，因?yàn)橹袊谀抢镉心敲炊嗟耐顿Y。

　　Imagine what happens when the numbers [denoting the size of the economy] diverge even more between China and the U.S.

　　想象一下如果中美之間的數(shù)字（指經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模）差距進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大會(huì)發(fā)生什么。

　　Still, China would be a relatively poor country compared to the U.S. How can a poor country exercise power internationally?

　　《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》：盡管如此，相對(duì)美國而言，中國仍將是一個(gè)相對(duì)貧窮的國家。一個(gè)窮國怎么能在全球發(fā)揮其經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力的威力呢？

　　Very poor countries can't dominate. There's now no way to project power abroad because the problems at home are so deep. But so-called middle income countries like China may be different. 薩博拉曼尼亞：非常貧窮的國家無法主導(dǎo)全球。由于本身的問題還很嚴(yán)重，窮國無法去國外耀武揚(yáng)威。不過像中國這樣的所謂中等收入國家可能就不同了。

　　There are different kinds of dominance. There is dominance of the U.S. a leader that's democratic and pursues international values and which inspires followship. Maybe China won't have that. But it could exercise a negative form of dominance, either through its exchange rate policy or by buying up commodities [to corner markets].

　　主導(dǎo)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)有不同的方式。如今美國作為全球主導(dǎo)，是個(gè)民主的領(lǐng)袖，追求國際價(jià)值，能夠吸引他國的追隨。中國可能不會(huì)如此。它有可能會(huì)采取一種消極的主導(dǎo)方式，通過其匯率政策或是大舉買進(jìn)商品（以壟斷市場(chǎng)）。

　　WSJ: What's the biggest threat to China's rise to economic dominance? 《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》：阻礙中國崛起成為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)袖的最大威脅是什么？

　　A political shock to system. Then all bets are off.

　　薩博拉曼尼亞：政治體系出現(xiàn)動(dòng)蕩。一旦如此，一切都是徒勞。

　　A political transition [to a more democratic system] hasn't occurred. It's a cloud that hangs over everything. There's class divide, geographic divide, lack of political freedom. If they wind up in conflagration, things could go really bad.

　　政權(quán)（向更為民主體系的）變更尚未出現(xiàn)，這是懸在一切之上的陰云。中國階級(jí)分化明顯，地域差距嚴(yán)重，政治又缺乏自由。如果這些矛盾激化爆發(fā)，事態(tài)將十分嚴(yán)重。

　　In your book, you talk about the importance of tethering China to a multilateral system. Why should China be interested if it's inevitably number one?

　　《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》：你在書中談到將中國納入一個(gè)多邊體系的重要性？如果勢(shì)將成為全球領(lǐng)袖，中國為何要對(duì)此感興趣呢？

　　We need to bind China today to the multilateral system so a kind of habit and incentive builds up. Then repudiation of the system would be more difficult. We need to do this before China becomes a hegemon.

　　薩博拉曼尼亞：我們需要在今天就將中國與多邊體系聯(lián)系在一起，這樣一來習(xí)慣和動(dòng)力就形成了，日后要拋開這個(gè)體系就會(huì)比較困難。我們需要在中國成為霸主之前做這件事。

　　Everyone has to come together to do this well. If every country tries to make its own deal with China, no one will have any leverage.

　　要做好這件事，所有人都要團(tuán)結(jié)起來。如果每個(gè)國家都試圖私下和中國做交易，那么就沒有一個(gè)國家能有任何影響力了。

　　Think about exchange rates. If the world came together now and said let's do a deal on exchange rates, China would be more likely to participate. It doesn't want to be seen as deviant from international system. The opprobrium of the world is the biggest carrot and stick to use with China.

　　想想?yún)R率問題。如果現(xiàn)在全世界團(tuán)結(jié)起來說，我們做一筆匯率交易吧，那么中國參與其中的可能性才會(huì)更大些。中國不愿意被視作遠(yuǎn)離多邊體系的異類。世界各國的指責(zé)是對(duì)付中國最有用的胡蘿卜加大棒。

　　One of your main policy recommendations is to start a China round of trade negotiations. What could that accomplish? 《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》：你的一個(gè)主要政策建議是開始和中國進(jìn)行一輪貿(mào)易談判。這將如何完成呢？

　　When China joined World Trade Organization in 2001, people said we tied China to the global economic system (because of the commitments it made to open its markets and follow international rules). But through its exchange rate policy, China has unraveled parts of its commitments. What that signifies is that Chinese leaders at the time were overreaching in terms of domestic political support. Evidently, WTO accession wasn't politically sustainable internally.

　　薩博拉曼尼亞：當(dāng)2001年中國加入世界貿(mào)易組織(World Trade Organization, 簡(jiǎn)稱WTO)時(shí)，人們說我們將中國納入到了全球經(jīng)濟(jì)系統(tǒng)中來了（因?yàn)橹袊尤隬TO時(shí)承諾要開放市場(chǎng)并遵循國際準(zhǔn)則）。然而通過其匯率政策，中國避開了部分承諾的束縛。這說明，從國內(nèi)政治支持的角度來說，當(dāng)時(shí)的中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人有點(diǎn)求之過急了。很顯然，中國國內(nèi)的政治情況不容許入世承諾一一兌現(xiàn)。

　　Over time, China will move away from mercantilism. They would then have an incentive to make a deal. A deal could involve government procurement other countries opening their bidding for China─as well as commitments by China involving control of natural resources and the exchange rate.

　　長期而言，中國終將會(huì)脫離重商主義。那時(shí)中國將有動(dòng)力來與別國做交易，包括政府采購……中國也會(huì)做出有關(guān)自然資源控制權(quán)和匯率問題的承諾。