Years ago, when Industrial & Commercial Bank of China was getting ready to list, it went through its own spring cleaning of its balance sheet. It established Huarong Asset Management, a platform to take all its bad debts, while the Ministry of Finance recapitalised the bank itself.

　　多年前，當中國工商銀行(ICBC)準備上市時，對自身的資產(chǎn)負債表進行了一場“春季大掃除”，成立了華融資產(chǎn)管理公司(Huarong Asset Management)，作為接收其全部壞賬的平臺，同時，中國財政部對該行進行了資本重組。

　　Today, Huarong has reinvented itself as a non-bank financial institution. Its Hong Kong affiliate is busy making loans to those who can not borrow in China directly from ICBC itself, albeit at much higher rates of up to 20 per cent per year, thanks to introductions from the big Chinese bank.

　　如今，華融已經(jīng)改頭換面，成為一家非銀行金融機構(gòu)。在中國無法直接從工行貸到款的人，在這家大行的推介之下，紛紛轉(zhuǎn)向華融在香港的分支機構(gòu)貸款，不過利率要高出許多，年息最高達20%。

　　Many of Huarong’s borrowers are second-tier property developers who can’t get credit at home as China tries to slow a rise in property prices which threaten social stability.

　　華融的許多貸款者是二線房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商，由于中國正力圖平抑已危及社會穩(wěn)定的房價漲勢，這些開發(fā)商在國內(nèi)貸不到款。

　　Usually, these borrowers are able to get the money back across the border into China.

　　通常而言，這些貸款者都能夠把錢弄過境，帶回內(nèi)地。

　　So the platform that was originally created to deal with ICBC’s problem loans may well now be creating the next round of problem loans instead.

　　于是，這個原本為了處置工行不良貸款而創(chuàng)建的平臺，如今很可能正在制造下一波不良貸款。

　　Such concerns are one reason that bank shares are down 10 per cent this month and trading is at all time lows in terms of price-to-book value, according to GaveKal Dragonomics.

　　GaveKal Dragonomics表示，上述擔憂是銀行股本月下跌10%、按市凈率計處于歷史最低位的原因之一。

　　Analysts disagree on the extent to which Chinese regulators have succeeded in putting a stop to the breakneck lending of the past two years. But fears linger that China will careen from the overheated pace of investment of the past two years to the opposite extreme in which companies cannot get any credit. That outcome would have dire consequences for the macro economy.

　　對于中國監(jiān)管機構(gòu)在遏制近兩年的放貸狂潮上取得了多大成功，分析師們莫衷一是。但人們一直擔心，中國可能從最近兩年的投資過熱轉(zhuǎn)向另一個極端，即企業(yè)完全貸不到款。這種結(jié)果將給宏觀經(jīng)濟造成可怕影響。

　　But lack of credit is not yet the problem. Credit is still flowing in China, although at a slower pace and with a higher cost, thanks to non-banks in Hong Kong such as Huarong.

　　不過，眼下尚未出現(xiàn)信貸短缺問題。在中國，信貸仍在涌動，盡管速度有所放緩，而且拜香港的非銀行金融機構(gòu)（如華融）所賜，成本有所上升。

　　Bank credit in Hong Kong stands at 240 per cent of gross domestic product, according to data from JPMorgan, mostly reflecting the arrival of Chinese borrowers circumventing restrictions at home. In mainland China itself the figure is 120 per cent.

　　根據(jù)摩根大通(JPMorgan)的數(shù)據(jù)，香港的銀行信貸占本地生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)比例為240%。這主要反映出許多中國貸款者繞開內(nèi)地限制措施，前來香港借貸的事實。中國內(nèi)地的這一比例為120%。

　　The current problem is just how much money is going to the high-end property market, precisely because China depends so heavily on the property market for its economic growth – and how little is going to more productive small and medium enterprises.

　　當前問題在于：有多少資金正流向高端房地產(chǎn)市場？因為中國的經(jīng)濟增長對房地產(chǎn)市場的依賴程度極高。另一方面，流向更具生產(chǎn)力的中小企業(yè)的資金到底少到什么程度？

　　A big part of the Chinese miracle has to do with the fact that over this past decade China’s economic expansion was driven by quality growth that came from making things that the rest of the world wanted to buy at a price that no other country could match. That was because Chinese labour was both cheap and productive and because China offered unique economies of scale. Even now, with rising inflation in wages, China still has the advantage of those economies of scale.

　　“中國奇跡”很大程度上以下事實相關(guān)：在過去的十年間，中國通過生產(chǎn)世界其他地區(qū)都愿意購買、價格低到無人能及的商品，實現(xiàn)了優(yōu)質(zhì)的增長，以此推動了中國的經(jīng)濟擴張。個中原因在于，中國勞動力既便宜又高產(chǎn)，同時中國具有規(guī)模經(jīng)濟效應(yīng)。即使是現(xiàn)在，盡管工資日趨上漲，中國依然具備規(guī)模經(jīng)濟的優(yōu)勢。

　　By contrast, most of the rest of Asia’s growth came the easy way – by putting up endless apartment towers that swell gross domestic product, but not in a sustainable way, thus paving the way for the Asian financial crisis.

　　相比之下，亞洲其他地區(qū)大多是通過便捷的途徑實現(xiàn)了增長——即沒完沒了地蓋樓，以此推高GDP，但這不是一種可持續(xù)的方式，從而為那場亞洲金融危機埋下了隱患。

　　Yet mainland China has now become too dependent on the easy economic growth that comes from putting up concrete blocks which are then traded like sardines. Beijing today looks much more like Bangkok in 1997 than it looks like it did itself back then.

　　然而，中國內(nèi)地如今已經(jīng)變得過度依賴于那種便捷的經(jīng)濟增長途徑——堆砌像沙丁魚罐頭一樣的混凝土建筑。今日之北京與1997年之曼谷的相像程度，遠甚于其與昔日自己相像的程度。

　　At the same time, the government has become much less effective in its attempts to bully the economy to move in the direction it desires. In the mid-1990s – the last time China faced rising prices and inflationary pressures – Zhu Rongji, then-premier, could use administrative measures far more effectively than is possible today because the economy is much more complex today than it was 15 years ago.

　　與此同時，政府已不能像以前那樣有效地按照自己意愿來駕馭經(jīng)濟運行方向。上世紀90年代中期，也就是上次中國物價節(jié)節(jié)攀升、通脹壓力極大的時候，時任總理朱镕基能夠極為有效地采用行政手段，但放在今天則不太可能，因為如今的中國經(jīng)濟遠比15年前復雜得多。

　　Today, all the choices involve difficult trade-offs: local governments need revenue from land sales since that is their main source of income and have a vested interest in keeping prices high. The interest on bank deposits is still negative, leading investors to put their money into property because they do not trust the stock market and there is not much else in which they can invest, as long as capital controls remain in place.

　　如今，擺在眼前的所有選擇都涉及到艱難的取舍：地方政府需要賣地收入，因為那是他們的主要收入來源，所以維持高房價是他們的既得利益所在。銀行存款利率仍為負值，促使投資者把錢投到房地產(chǎn)市場上，因為他們不信任股市，而只要中國繼續(xù)施行資本管制，他們除了這兩者以外就沒什么投資渠道。

　　There is a need for more housing. But it will not be met by the luxury flats that can now be seen in third- and fourth-tier cities where there is not the sort of rising income that could support that kind of high-end market.

　　中國需要更多的住房。但是，如今在三、四線城市都可見到的豪華住宅滿足不了這種需求，這些城市的收入增長狀況，無法支撐那種高端市場。

　　Today, it is hard to know what the cost of all this actually will actually be.

　　目前，我們無法知道這一切究竟將會造成什么損害。

　　In the official sector, where ICBC itself dwells, rates are low and the cost of capital is, if anything, too cheap. Foreign investors are beginning to look elsewhere for opportunities since asset prices are so inflated, reflecting the fact that credit is still available. In India, by contrast, bank credit as a percentage of GDP is a mere 52 per cent.

　　在正統(tǒng)的放貸領(lǐng)域，即工行所處的這一塊，利率很低，資金成本低廉到簡直可忽略不計。外國投資者正開始去別處尋找機會，因為這里的資產(chǎn)價格過高，這說明信貸仍然是可以獲得的。相比之下，印度銀行信貸占GDP的比例僅為52%。

　　Meanwhile, outside the official sector, where Huarong sits, the cost of capital is much higher.

　　另一方面，在正統(tǒng)放貸部門之外，即華融所在的行當，資金成本則要高出許多。

　　But China will not always be awash with cash. It needs to spend more wisely today while capital is still abundant.

　　但是，中國不可能總是有大量資金。當前，趁著資金仍然充裕，中國需要更明智地花錢。